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Abstract 
The liberal international order (LIO) is experiencing a legitimacy crisis in its Western heartland. 
What causes this crisis? Existing approaches focus on the LIO’s unequal allocation of wealth 
and values that produces losers and thus breeds dissatisfaction. Yet, why this dissatisfaction 
translates into a delegitimation of the order rather than a contestation over policies remains 
unaccounted for. Complementing the cultural and economic backlash hypotheses, this paper 
advances an institutionalist explanation for the current crisis of the LIO, which accounts for the 
growing resistance to the LIO with a political backlash hypothesis. Our argument is that the 
institutional characteristics of the LIO’s political order trigger self-undermining processes by 
inciting opposition that cannot be politically accommodated and is thus bound to turn into polity 
contestation. In particular, we hold that IOs’ predominantly technocratic legitimation rationale 
on the one hand, and their increasing political authority with distributional effects on the other, 
create a democracy gap. It implies that avenues to absorb opposition through input channels are 
largely missing and thus incite the erosion of the LIO’s general acceptance. We illustrate the 
plausibility of this argument with evidence from the European Union (EU) as well as the 
international regimes on trade and human rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The liberal international order (LIO), a tight-knit network of trans- and international institutions 
pursuing economically and politically liberal goals, saw its foundations laid in the period after 
World War II and rose to an authoritative ensemble in the aftermath of the Cold War (Ikenberry 
2011, Zürn 2018). While it seemed on a constant trajectory for long, today the LIO has come 
under considerable stress. For one, shifting global power constellations have led an increasing 
number of non-Western states to demand fundamental changes in the order or to create discrete 
institutional alternatives to it (Zangl et al. 2016; Stephen and Zürn 2019). While this challenge 
is exogenous, another challenge that we want to focus on emanates from the LIO’s own core: 
its decreasing empirical legitimacy particularly in those societies that used to be the main 
drivers of liberal international integration. Dwindling political support for key institutions of 
the LIO has become most visible in the past decade which has seen the United States’ 
withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord as well as its active sabotage of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Moreover, the entire 
European Union (EU) has come under fire against the backdrop of debt and migration crises, 
which have reinforced the popularity of Eurosceptic and nationalist political parties (Börzel and 
Risse 2018; de Vries 2018). Such centrifugal tendencies challenging the EU integration project 
have reached their pinnacle in the Brexit vote, which – as some argue – is partly a reflection of 
a broader trend towards nationalist populism (Inglehart and Norris 2017).  
While not the only manifestation of an anti-liberal and anti-internationalist backlash, populist 
politics throughout the Western world do strongly delegitimize the LIO (see e.g. Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Mounk 2018; Zielonka 2018): Claiming to represent the true voice of 
the people, populist parties and leaders are hostile towards the allegedly unaccountable and 
corrupt elites that run domestic and international institutions. In this context, IOs have become 
targets of populist denunciation because they are seen to actively assist the hollowing out of 
national and, by implication, popular sovereignty. Calls for regaining political control for the 
people, re-asserting national sovereignty, and replacing liberal with “illiberal democracy” 
(Mounk 2018) – a system responsive only to the voice of the one people – have gained traction 
in advanced industrial democracies. They stand in direct opposition to the norms and rules 
embodied by the wealth of IOs underpinning the LIO.  
In fact, as shown by Bearce and Jolliff Scott, public support for IOs in general has declined 
markedly since the mid-1990s: “Indeed, it could even be argued that the median voter in most 
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countries currently holds an attitude that is not supportive of international organizations.” 
(Bearce and Jolliff Scott 2019, 195). Arguably, legitimacy beliefs towards the LIO have 
declined to an extent that we can speak of a legitimacy crisis, that is, the moment “when the 
level of social recognition that its identity, interests, practices, norms, or procedures are rightful 
declines to the point where the actor or institution must either adapt […] or face 
disempowerment.” (Reus-Smit 2007, 158). 
How did we get here? There are two main explanatory approaches to account for the crisis of 
legitimacy that has befallen the LIO. According to the economic backlash hypothesis, 
unfettered economic and financial globalization spurred by (neo-)liberal international economic 
and financial institutions led to opposition to the LIO from a socio-politically leftist point of 
view (Blyth 2016). While helping increase net wealth, these institutions have contributed to the 
unsettling of the post-War embedded liberalism compromise (Ruggie 1982) and with it “the 
social contract at the core of liberal democracy: those who do well in a market-based society 
promise to make sure that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall too far behind.” 
(Colgan and Keohane 2017). Following the cultural backlash hypothesis, globalization has laid 
bare an intensifying cultural rift between proponents and opponents of LI (Hooghe and Marks 
2018). Arguably, this rift has been intensified by the progressive value change engendered by 
liberal international institutions that has remained unmatched at the local level (Inglehart and 
Norris 2016). This cleavage has come to influence vote choice and party competition at the 
domestic level, empowering mostly right-wing populist forces and affecting governments’ 
willingness and ability to support the LIO.  
While we do not dispute the plausibility of either of these accounts as immediate causes of 
dissatisfaction with the LIO, we submit that the economic and cultural backlash arguments 
leave one important blank spot: They do not fully account for the reasons why the political 
dissatisfaction with the substantive output of the order does not merely spur political debate 
about policies, but incites a veritable legitimacy crisis. After all, economic and cultural demands 
are prototypical elements of policy debates that many political systems are able to absorb 
without facing existential challenges to their authority. The LIO, however, encounters the 
problem that policy contestation increasingly turns into polity contestation whereby actors 
delegitimize its fundamental institutional and constitutional setup.  
We argue that a missing piece in the puzzle complementing the economic and cultural 
explanations is the political dimension of the LIO (de Wilde et al. 2019). In a nutshell, our point 
is that the political order of the LIO has created a widening democracy gap that consists in 
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insufficient justifications for distributional decisions (be they about the allocation of wealth or 
values) and an insufficient responsiveness to changing political demands. It is brought about by 
the institutional logic inherent to the LIO: expanding multilateral regulation of global policy 
fields by way of legalizing commitments in international institutions and delegating tasks to 
supranational organizations, based on the goal to depoliticize the core norms of liberal 
internationalism. Given the concomitant rise of political authority held by IOs (Hooghe et al. 
2017; Zürn 2018), we observe a growing mismatch between the predominantly technocratic 
rationale that underpins their legitimacy and the distributional consequences of their decisions. 
Not only do intrusive IO measures induce contestation over policies, but, given the 
democratically inaccessible nature of most IOs, policy dissatisfaction is likely to turn into polity 
opposition and resistance (Mair 2007). The democracy gap may thus explain why substantive 
popular dissatisfaction with political directions at the economic or cultural level turn from 
policy into polity contestation and hence plunge the LIO into a crisis of legitimacy. Since the 
democracy gap is produced and widened as part of the LIO’s basic institutional logic, we argue 
that the order’s legitimacy crisis is endogenous to its own institutional structure. This also 
explains why the crisis of the LIO temporally coincides with its greatest success in the post-
Cold War era: Its institutional setup is self-undermining. 
The main goal of this paper is to provide a thorough theorization of our political explanation 
complementing the accounts building on economic and cultural factors. As a consequence, the 
empirical ambitions of this paper have to be more modest. Rather than providing a 
comprehensive empirical test, we probe the argument’s plausibility in one case study and two 
additional vignettes that provide initial evidence on the functioning of the theorized mechanism 
in diverse institutional settings. The ensuing sections first delineate our theoretical argument in 
more detail. In section 2, we show that the institutional characteristics of the LIO spur self-
reinforcing mechanisms that increasingly institutionalize and lock in liberal value choices at 
the global level. In section 3, we argue that these characteristics of the LIO trigger self-
undermining processes that exacerbate the erosion of the LIO’s social and political foundations. 
Sections 4 and 5 offer three empirical illustrations of our argument. We first illustrate the 
mechanism in one of the LIO’s most prominent sub-orders, namely the EU, in section 4. To 
demonstrate that the scope of our argument extends to different policy fields and institutions 
constitutive of the LIO, we subsequently apply our argument to the regimes of international 
trade and human rights. Finally, in section 6, we discuss avenues for future research, sketching 
possible scope conditions to gauge the relative strength of self-undermining processes as well 
as their effects.  
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2. The self-reinforcing institutionalization of liberal internationalism  
The international order and the institutions on which it is built today are stably directed towards 
the promotion of liberal policy goals such as free trade, human rights, democracy, and the rule 
of law. We argue that this is due to a set of inter-connected institutional effects increasing the 
returns to liberal internationalism (LI) over time. In this section, we first provide our working 
definition of the LIO and then highlight one discursive/ideational and one interest-based 
mechanism of dynamic reproduction and reinforcement of the liberal order.  
2.1. Liberalism, internationalism, and the liberal international order 
We understand LI as an ideational disposition to embrace liberal core values and to promote 
their global implementation through cooperative institutions (Keohane 2012). Political 
liberalism is associated with the essential principle of freedom of the individual, understood 
first and foremost as freedom from arbitrary rule ensured by legal and institutional constraints 
on authority as well as procedures for democratic participation. Its correlate is varieties of 
economic liberalism that imply a commitment to market economy and free trade, accompanied 
by a number of economic and social rights to foster individual capacities for freedom in the first 
place (Doyle 2012, 4-5). Internationalism takes liberal values to a cosmopolitan level. First, it 
introduces the idea that freedom of the individual is a universal norm to be pursued globally. 
Second, it aspires to inter- and transnational forms of cooperation between political 
communities to civilize global politics and incite domestic convergence towards the liberal 
canon (Bell 2007). State sovereignty thus becomes secondary to the fulfilment of basic promises 
of individual self-determination (Peters 2009).  
Today, the main tenets of LI are firmly enshrined in “an array of international institutions that 
wed the exercise of international power to liberal social purpose.” (Stephen and Skidmore 2019, 
65). Together, they constitute the contemporary LIO (see also Ikenberry 2011). It thus consists 
in the combination of procedural rules, e.g. institutionalized multilateralism, and substantive 
rules, e.g. the promotion of individual liberties, the rule of law, and open markets. Liberal ideas 
have spread at the global level to an extent that Boli and Thomas (1999, 34-41) speak of an 
extensive liberal ‘world culture’ characterized by individualism, universalism, rationalism, 
development (understood as economic growth, individual self-fulfillment, collective security, 
and justice), and world citizenship. 
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We argue that the progressive institutionalization of LI is best portrayed as a path-dependent 
development with self-reinforcing characteristics.1 In particular, we see two mechanisms of 
increasing returns to liberal institutions, one discursive/ideational and one interest-based.  
2.2. De-politicization by delegation 
At the discursive/ideational level, the proliferation of international institutions with liberal 
content, in particular after World War II and the end of the Cold War, has locked in liberal 
policy choices by de-politicizing the underlying normative questions and drastically reducing 
“access to contestation” (Wiener 2014). This is most clearly visible with regard to the initial 
delegation of governance functions to IO bureaucracies. Most of the IOs founded in the 
aftermath of World War II and after the Cold War represent an institutional embodiment of LI. 
On the one hand, the social goals they pursue can usually be subsumed under one of the liberal 
categories of democracy, human rights/humanitarianism, and material progress via free 
markets. On the other hand, their set-up – as putatively objective, impartial bureaucracies – 
reflects the rationalizing promise of cooperative multilateral institutions (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2005, 163-164). Moreover, the very shape of IO bodies as unpolitical bureaucracies 
also drives the continuous ideational/discursive reinforcement of those liberal principles. After 
all, bureaucracies’ main promise is to eliminate politicized influences by instituting continuous, 
rule-bound hierarchical systems that display a high degree of impersonality and take decisions 
based on sectoral expertise (Weber 1978, 220-223). 
A similar logic applies to the rising number of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that 
independently determine the meaning of international agreements and are tasked with their 
enforcement against members found to be in the wrong (Alter 2014). Particularly in the field of 
international trade and investment, dispute settlement bodies have come to assume the role of 
an international judiciary assuring abidance by the terms of liberal trade and investment 
regimes. This international “judicialization of politics” (Hirschl 2004) implies that fundamental 
political questions, for example about societal priorities regarding environmental protection or 
social welfare, become subject to legally enshrined (neo-)liberal premises (Gill and Cutler 
2014). Judicialization thus helps locking in liberal value choices by circumscribing the legally 
acceptable realm of domestic policymaking in a way conforming to liberal goals. The 
establishment and the conferral of monitoring, implementation, and adjudication tasks to 
bureaucratic IOs and judicial organs thus stabilizes initial normative choices by taking them out 
 
1 On the historical institutionalist foundations of path-dependency and increasing returns in International Relations, 
see, e.g., Fioretos 2011.  
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of the realm of the political and rendering them a matter of technical rule application. Simply 
put, what used to be domestically debatable policy options is transformed into international 
legal rules that are immensely difficult to contest because a) states lose the ability to unilaterally 
change paths below the threshold of treaty termination or non-compliance (both of which imply 
relatively high reputation and/or opportunity costs), and b) the implementation and further 
development of the policy is in the hands of a seemingly neutral and technical agency claiming 
to further the common good. This de-politicization and impartiality is also precisely what allows 
these institutions to gain moral and epistemic authority in diffusing liberal norms and 
monitoring their implementation (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, 173-174). IOs can present 
themselves as technocrats whose advice is unaffected by partisan squabbles. International 
courts (ICs) and court-like institutions claim to act independently and based on legal reasoning 
alone, thereby fueling the idea of an international rule of law in the common interest. This 
fosters acceptance of liberal ideas, limits the discursive space for contestation, and thus 
reinforces the institutionalization of LI.  
2.3. Creating vested interests  
The establishment of liberal international institutions has also set into motion mechanisms of 
increasing returns by creating powerful beneficiaries with vested interests and providing 
opportunities for domestic–international as well as state–society interactions with stabilizing 
network effects. The international trade regime provides a good example to illustrate this. The 
institution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 disproportionately 
benefitted a number of Western states with pre-existing open market economies and export-
oriented business models. These states, including the United States, Canada, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany, had obvious incentives to protect the liberal substance of the regime. 
Given that they were also the materially and institutionally most powerful actors, they could 
successfully block attempts to redistribute the costs and benefits through policy changes. At the 
same time, the costs of non-membership in GATT were high due to unfavorable trade relations 
and missing investment from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) states in particular. This incited more and more states to join, which, in turn, increased 
the collective benefit of the overall regime (Milner 1988).  
The reinforcement of the liberal trade regime was also flanked by the emergence of 
transnational networks of private/corporate actors. They had adapted their activities to the 
liberal international trade regime, benefitted from it, and used the international institutions as a 
commitment device to promote further trade liberalization with their domestic governments. In 
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this sense, the institutionalization of a liberal policy commitment facilitates the organization of 
interest groups pressuring governments to abide by and extend the rules they have accepted 
internationally. Not least, the international institutionalization of free trade also led to 
adaptations in domestic government structures that favored pro-free trade coalitions. This 
aspect highlights the domestic–international network effect that increases returns to liberal 
institutions at both levels as they mutually reinforce each other: “a liberal domestic order would 
favor a liberal international order, and a liberal international order would favor a liberal 
domestic order” (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, 166). International institutions thus not only 
render once adopted normative decisions more difficult to overturn, they also actively produce 
a more liberal world that becomes increasingly self-regulating.  
In sum, the existing LIO has arguably become more stable over time because its underpinning 
institutions have become ever more firmly embedded in the wider structures of politics and 
society (Ikenberry 2017, 69).  
 
3. The backlash: How the LIO triggers self-undermining processes 
We posit that these characteristics of the LIO, which have been decisive for its self-reinforcing 
institutionalization, may also trigger self-undermining processes that challenge the LIO’s social 
foundations. While self-reinforcing processes bolster existing institutions, self-undermining 
processes, or reactive sequences, are “marked by backlash processes that transform and perhaps 
reverse early events.” (Mahoney 2000, 526; emphasis in original) More precisely, in reactive 
sequences, “the institution alters opportunities and desires in such a way that actors – at least in 
the first place – challenge rather than reinforce existing rules.” (Hanrieder and Zürn, 94; see 
also Mahoney 2000, 526-535) That is, institutional procedures or practices create a backlash by 
triggering actors’ dissatisfaction for material or normative reasons and provide opportunities 
for dissatisfied actors to challenge existing institutions. 
We observe such a backlash in the declining legitimacy beliefs of governments and citizens 
towards liberal international institutions which amount to a legitimacy crisis (see, generally, 
Reus-Smit 2007; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Our suspicion is that this reactive sequence is 
induced by institutional characteristics of the LIO that spur its own de-legitimation. In a 
nutshell, we argue that the LIO is characterized by an increasing mismatch between the rising 
political authority of IOs and the technocratic rationale that underpins their legitimacy as de-
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politicized institutions. This mismatch results in a democracy gap,2 which is characterized by 
international institutional infrastructures that lack a justificatory reservoir for distributional 
decisions (be they about the allocation of wealth or values) on the one hand, and that are 
insufficiently responsive to the grievances of the affected populace on the other. As a 
consequence, policy dissatisfaction based on economic or cultural demands is likely to spill 
over into a more fundamental contestation of the political institutions constitutive of the LIO – 
a process that should mount in sync with a widening of the democracy gap (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The causal mechanism  
 
The interplay of two institutional characteristics of the LIO is responsible for creating a 
democracy gap that contributes to the erosion of the sociological legitimacy of the LIO. These 
characteristics are, first, the predominantly technocratic, output-oriented legitimation rationale 
of IOs and, second, the (increasing) political authority accorded to IOs. 
Technocratic legitimation rationale of IOs: IOs’ main source of legitimacy lies in the 
expectation that they produce pareto-optimizing outcomes based on their capacity to arrive at 
rational and expertise-driven decisions (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009). Their 
recognition as rightful decision-makers is thus predominantly based on outputs, not 
(democratic) inputs (Scharpf 1999). To liberal internationalists, IOs have become symbols of 
progress based on the belief “in the capacity of technological change and markets to transform 
the character of global politics in positive ways by creating ever-expanding material resources 
that can ameliorate social conflicts.” (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, 165) Indeed, from a 
 
2 We use the term ‘democracy gap’ rather than ‘democratic deficit’ to highlight the disconnect between two 
different logics of legitimizing authority, the technocratic logic based on expertise and the democratic logic based 
on popular consent.  
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democratic perspective, the epistemic or technocratic quality of IO authority may be a sufficient 
legitimacy base as long as IO decisions do not create losers or allow for losers to be 
compensated (Scharpf 1999). The institutional design of IOs largely reflects this assumption. 
With few exceptions, IOs’ channels of input legitimation are restricted to the delegation chains 
from domestic will-formation to national governments to government representatives in IO 
bodies. IOs’ accountability to member states and member states’ accountability to citizens thus 
arguably provide sufficient democratic credentials for IOs (Moravcsik 2004). Genuinely 
democratic input at the supranational level is almost inexistent. Accordingly, international and 
transnational institutions justify their authority predominantly on the basis of a technocratic 
legitimation rationale, not on the basis of the democratic quality of their decision-making 
procedures: “In general, their legitimation narrative points to effectiveness, wealth, and superior 
knowledge” (Zürn 2017, 278). 
Rise of international political authority: The institutional lock-in of LI through the relocation 
of decision-making capacity from national to international institutions has prompted an 
incremental rise of political authority exercised by IOs. Political authority refers to the right of 
individuals acting on behalf of an institution to issue prescriptions, rules, orders, or judgments 
that are recognized as binding by the addressees even if they go against the short-term interests 
of some community members (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). While international 
cooperation was long marked by intergovernmental international institutions following the 
consensus principle, since the end of the Cold War in particular, there has been an increase in 
international cooperation with more supranational elements (Genschel and Zangl 2014; Zürn 
2018). For one, the scope of issues governed by IOs has expanded. More importantly, however, 
the governance activities of IOs have also become more intrusive. For instance, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) now deals with ‘behind-the-border issues’ such as copyright 
infringements, public procurement, and corporate taxation. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) takes over de facto control of public budgets and fiscal policy in member states at the 
risk of sovereign default. The United Nations Security Council no longer takes measures only 
against states, but increasingly also against groups and single individuals (Kreuder-Sonnen and 
Zangl 2015). Overall, IOs increasingly take decisions with distributional consequences. Recent 
empirical research confirms that there has in fact been a broader rise in IO authority, most 
notably since the heydays of LI after 1990 (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder 
forthcoming). On the one hand, states have increasingly delegated governance tasks to 
supranational IO organs and pooled their sovereignty in intergovernmental bodies – rendering 
their decision-making power and resources subject to collective agreement (Hooghe and Marks 
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2015). On the other hand, IOs with pooled or delegated authority have also seen a broadening 
of the scope of their activities and an increased bindingness of their judgments and decisions. 
Democracy gap: Accordingly, today’s LIO is populated by IOs whose activities have 
increasingly tangible distributional consequences, but whose avenues of legitimation remain 
predominantly output-oriented. We consider this to represent a growing democracy gap because 
the technocratic legitimation logic which underpins IO rule-making authority does not match 
the consequences of the rise of IOs’ political authority: When IOs adopt rules or help bring 
about policies with distributional implications – creating winners and losers – superior 
knowledge or expertise alone are an insufficient ground for IOs to command legitimacy (see 
also Zürn 2017). These kinds of decisions require democratic input (Scharpf 1999). At the 
domestic level, it is common sense that taxation and social welfare, for example, are not 
questions to be solved by way of expert deliberation, but through participatory forms of interest 
aggregation (Habermas 1996). Internationally, however, there has so far been no sufficient 
compensatory democratic input for the growth of politically salient IO decisions.  
The democracy gap is characterized by two features. The first is a justification deficit. The 
integral normative structure of the LIO is locked in and de-politicized. Not only does this create 
a lack of contestability, it also induces a shortage of justification. Authority-holders in the LIO 
make few attempts to convince the rule-addressees that their foundations and decisions are 
normatively justified. The foundations are taken for granted and the decisions are presented as 
inevitable and ‘right’. However, this technocratic legitimation rationale built into the LIO offers 
an insufficient basis to justify political decisions with distributive consequences. The more the 
scope of IO authority expands to include fundamentally political decisions and tangible 
intrusions in ‘behind the border issues’, the more IOs’ epistemic legitimation narrative is 
overburdened. The attempt to nurture a belief in the rightfulness of their rule is thus increasingly 
hampered.  
Second, the democracy gap is marked by a responsiveness deficit. That is, the LIO lacks 
democratic institutional infrastructures that would allow popular grievances to be 
accommodated in inter- and supranational decision-making processes. Indeed, some IOs have 
established representative institutions such as parliamentary assemblies to add a veneer of 
democracy to their authority (Rittberger 2005; Rittberger and Schroeder 2016; Rocabert et al. 
2018). Moreover, IOs have generally become more open to the participation of a broader range 
of stakeholders, in particular non-governmental organizations (Tallberg et al. 2013). However, 
compared to the far-reaching consequences of IOs’ political authority, the existing 
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representative institutions and access points for non-state actors are insufficiently consequential 
(Follesdal and Hix 2006). Moreover, the quasi-constitutional lock-in of core norms of LI 
sharply reduces the range of contestable issues in the first place (Gill and Cutler 2014; Grimm 
2017). Hence, whether emanating from economic or cultural dissatisfaction with the LIO, 
substantive political demands deviating from the liberal script are structurally underrepresented 
and disadvantaged in IOs.  
Contestation and de-legitimation of the LIO: What are the political consequences of the 
democracy gap? In reaction to the rise of international political authority and its justification 
deficit, (national) public discourses over international institutions have become both more 
salient and more polarized in the recent past. The de-politicization ‘from above’ has thus been 
met with incipient forms of politicization ‘from below’ (see e.g. Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-
Ehrhardt 2012; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014). As a result of the responsiveness deficit, however, 
policy-contestation cannot be fed into the relevant political decision-making processes on the 
inter- or supra-national level. In fact, the institutional characteristics of the LIO are designed 
precisely to be immune to such contestation. Its liberal core is locked in and institutionally well-
protected from democratic politics. The ‘logic of no alternative’, which is often brought to the 
LIO’s defense, further reduces the order’s susceptibility to alternative arguments (Hay 2007, 
124). Hence, domestic contestation of IO policies has little prospect of substantively affecting 
the political direction of international institutions.  
As Mair has pointed out, such limitations on the access to substantive contestation are bound 
to lead to the mobilization of principled opposition (Mair 2007), that is, opposition directed not 
against particular policies, characteristic of the democratic process, but towards the polity per 
se. In line with this reasoning, we expect that the LIO’s democracy gap is responsible for 
eventually turning policy contestation into polity contestation.3 The main observable 
implication of polity contestation is public statements that question an IO’s overall legitimacy 
by criticizing its institutional/constitutional setup. Following our political backlash narrative, 
we expect such criticism to highlight alleged democracy problems in particular. For example, 
arguments should be salient that people lack voice in IO decision-making (“we have no say”), 
emphasizing that the preferences or grievances of one’s group are structurally neglected, and 
that the liberal elites running IOs are unaccountable and unresponsive to the interests and 
grievances of the respective constituents. On the demand side, support for such principled 
opposition is reflected in the rise of broad-based political attitudes, particularly in OECD 
 
3 For the conceptual distinction, see also de Wilde and Trenz 2012; Braun, Hutter, and Kerscher 2016. 
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countries, which squarely contradict the essence of LI by defending border closure, cultural 
particularism, and national sovereignty (Zürn and de Wilde 2016). In fact, the more a country 
is globally integrated and thus subject to international authority, the more such ‘demarcationist’ 
or ‘communitarian’ attitudes seem to grow and polarize political communities (Koopmans and 
Zürn 2019).  
Scope conditions: In sum, we argue that, ceteris paribus, the LIO’s democracy gap increases 
the likelihood of the contestation of the order’s constitutive institutions, which contributes to 
their legitimacy crisis. Importantly, our argument does not rest on the assumption that people 
genuinely care about the democratic quality of IOs or that their preference for democratic 
governance is what motivates them to reject international authority. In fact, we believe that the 
main sources of dissatisfaction with the LIO are substantive issues in economic or value 
politics. However, it is the institutions’ democratic unresponsiveness to the concomitant 
demands that explains the transition from policy to polity contestation. That being said, it should 
be clear that the mechanism theorized above is only likely to occur if an IO gives rise to 
economic or cultural dissatisfaction in the first place. In turn, the odds for this happening 
increase with the level of political authority enjoyed by the IO, allowing it to take decisions 
over the allocation of wealth or values.  
Furthermore, the democracy gap is dependent on the simultaneous presence of both an IO with 
political authority and a technocratic legitimation rationale. Not all technocratic IO agencies 
enjoy political authority, and not all IOs with political authority are purely technocratic. We 
posit that for the democracy gap to emerge and ignite the political backlash mechanism, both 
factors should be amply present. Even where a democracy gap shows, however, we do not 
expect the mechanism to be triggered in every instance. Apart from domestic-level intervening 
or mediating factors (see section 6.), we suggest that at least one of two additional macro-
conditions needs to be met for the process to start. First, IOs must not only possess formal 
competencies and thus a potential to exercise authority, their authority also needs to be factually 
exercised, such that the distributive implications are felt among broader societal groups. 
Second, either as a reinforcement of the first or as an alternative driver, the mobilization 
potential inherent to the democracy gap must be activated by cues from political elites or the 
media (see Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007; Schmidtke 2018). 
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4. A plausibility probe: The legitimacy crisis of the EU 
In the remainder of this paper, we seek to demonstrate the applicability of our theoretical 
argument by offering three empirical illustrations. Since our main objective is to contribute to 
theory development, our focus has been on the theoretical specification of multiple complex 
and dynamic relationships. A comprehensive empirical test of our arguments is therefore 
beyond the scope of this paper. As an “intermediary stage before moving directly from 
hypotheses construction to time-consuming empirical tests” (Levy 2008, 7), we start with a 
plausibility probe of our theoretical proposition by demonstrating its empirical relevance in an 
important case and two additional vignettes to highlight the broader relevance of our argument 
(see section 5) (Eckstein 1975, 109-110). For our illustrative case study, we analyze the current 
legitimacy crisis of the EU. The EU can be considered the most highly developed sub-order of 
the LIO, exhibiting all the main tenets of LI enshrined in legal institutions (see Ikenberry 2018, 
14). Its recent Eurozone crisis makes the EU a particularly suitable candidate for illustrative 
purposes, because it spurred observable changes in all variables of interest to our model.   
The crisis as catalyst for rising political authority: The EU is a multi-purpose IO that displays 
comparatively high levels of political authority, reflected in the scope of decision-making 
pooling and the delegation of competences granted to EU institutions (see Lenz and Marks 
2016). While the degree of political authority varies across different issue areas, the 1980s and 
1990s saw a pronounced upward trend across a wide range of policy fields, which do not only 
concern economic and social regulation, but also distributive policies, such as agricultural 
subsidies and structural (adjustment) funds, as well as so-called ‘core state powers’ (Genschel 
and Jachtenfuchs 2014).  What is more, against the backdrop of the Eurozone crisis, we could 
witness a veritable boost in the EU’s political authority. Centralized lending capacities were 
created through the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), and supranational surveillance mechanisms were instituted to oversee the 
implementation of concomitant economic and fiscal consolidation measures designed for 
indebted countries (i.e. the troika). Moreover, member states also introduced a stricter 
regulatory framework for Eurozone member states (Laffan and Schlosser 2016). National 
budgets are now under more stringent supranational control and member states violating the 
balanced budget rule can be sanctioned quasi-automatically (Schimmelfennig 2014, 326). The 
Eurozone crisis has thus provided leverage for institutional reforms, resulting in a significant 
boost in political authority that was not only potential, but also exercised in a way palpable in 
domestic societies. 
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Crisis politics and the impasse of technocratic legitimacy: The EU’s crisis politics is not only 
about mounting political authority, but it also highlights the limitations of the technocratic 
legitimation rationale to justify IOs’ (exercise of) political authority. As explained above, this 
rationale becomes overburdened when political decisions generate conflicts over political 
values and ideologies, or when they produce material winners and losers. The Eurozone crisis 
and the flurry of institutional and policy reforms offer a vivid illustration of the overburdening 
of the technocratic problem-solving approach. Many elements of Eurozone crisis governance 
were designed, by and large, in accordance with the technocratic playbook: Eurozone 
governments further empowered non-majoritarian actors, such as the Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB), seeking to isolate political decisions from parliamentary 
interference and popular opposition, and put emphasis on the technicity and inevitability of 
these decisions (Kreuder-Sonnen 2018b). However, the substantive measures adopted in this 
context had tangible distributional effects. Most obviously, fiscal assistance through the EFSF 
and the ESM from creditor to debtor states was conditioned on the latter’s implementation of 
macroeconomic adjustment programs. Recipients of emergency credits such as Greece and 
Portugal were thus compelled to subscribe to far-reaching austerity reforms, which intruded 
deeply into their welfare systems by, inter alia, drastically reducing the amount of health care 
provision, pensions and unemployment benefits (Petmesidou and Glatzer 2015). Moreover, the 
governance efforts to save the common currency implied costly interventions not only on the 
side of the ‘recipient’ countries, but also for the ‘donor’ countries. For instance, the bailout 
programs implied that the latter are liable if loans can no longer be serviced. It also implied 
that, in times of tight budgets, even creditor countries are likely to feel the fiscal burden (Hix 
2015, 189).  
This conflict over the distributive implications of the Eurozone governance reforms was 
reinforced by a clash over values and ideas, which hardened the existing ‘material’ conflict 
between creditors and debtors. Governments favoring neo-liberal ideas and budgetary 
discipline, most notably creditor countries, such as Germany, were in stark opposition to 
governments backing policies geared towards debt pooling and hence more centralized forms 
of economic and fiscal governance (epitomized by proposals to create Eurobonds). This conflict 
over (economic) ideas not only emboldened political actors, thereby shrinking room for 
compromise, but also contributed to a deepening of social divisions across the EU as suggested 
by the narrative of ‘Northern Saints’ and ‘Southern Sinners’ (Matthijs and McNamara 2015). 
While the political solutions to the Eurozone crisis were thus modelled on the technocratic 
template, their political and social implications defy a technocratic legitimation rationale. 
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Instead, they are even seen as contributing to rather than soothing the social and economic woes 
in the countries on the EU’s periphery (Matthijs 2017; Scharpf 2013). 
The democracy gap widens: The politics of the Eurozone crisis illustrates how the lingering 
tension between the exercise of political authority and its technocratic legitimation amplifies 
the democracy gap of international governance: A substantial increase in the EU’s political 
authority has resulted in an unprecedented scope of intrusiveness, unsettling political and social 
fabrics in the crisis-ridden states; at the same time, these interventions are legitimized primarily 
with reference to technocratic, not democratic principles. This is not a coincidence: The policy 
solutions to address the crisis were aiming to de-politicize the EU’s rescue of its ordoliberal 
economic constitution to avoid political opposition (Kriesi and Grande 2015; Oppermann 2014; 
Schimmelfennig 2014). For instance, from the outset of the crisis, the German government 
framed the challenge posed by the crisis as exceptional and even existential for the EU’s 
survival (Oppermann 2014, 267). The Merkel government advocated the design of various 
institutional mechanisms, such as the ‘debt brake’ or the ‘European Semester’, to circumscribe 
member states’ discretion in fiscal and budgetary matters. These strategies were actively aimed 
at de-politicizing the respective issues, framing them – as chancellor Merkel had (in)famously 
put it – as ‘alternativlos’ (without alternative) (Séville 2017). Crisis governance justifications 
thus largely followed the technocratic template highlighting the political and social desirability 
– if not inevitability – of the executed measures and their putative outcomes. Instead of seeking 
open deliberation about possible alternatives, ‘TINA’ (there is no alternative) arguments about 
the necessity of crisis measures (to avert the supposed threat to the political order) were 
advanced to pre-empt objections and reduce contestability (White 2015). The social and 
economic ramifications of the EU’s crisis governance for member states’ economies and 
welfare states underline the limits of the technocratic legitimation rationale.  
The political backlash: As an initial consequence of the crisis, it has been shown that European 
issues have become more politicized (Kriesi and Grande 2016). A broad range of actors 
formulated positions on and demands towards the policies of European institutions. Originally, 
these were driven by variable substantive dissatisfactions. Debates revolved around policy 
questions, including, for instance, whether state budgets should be consolidated through 
austerity measures or whether economic growth should be stimulated by way of public 
investments. The technocratic justifications fell short of inciting deference to authoritative 
political allocations. On a wide array of mostly economic and partly also cultural (cross-national 
solidarity) issues, the direction of the EU was contested (Kriesi 2016). This plurality of views, 
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however, was not accommodated in the political process dominating the governance of the 
crisis. Given the responsiveness deficit inherent in the democracy gap, policy opposition did 
not translate into changing policies. To the contrary, to smoothly implement the neo-liberal 
policy solutions, both political and technocratic leaders of European institutions followed a 
strategy of de-politicization, seeking to shun democratic debate and to circumvent political and 
institutional constraints (see also Schimmelfennig 2014; Kreuder-Sonnen 2016). 
As a consequence, policy contestation increasingly turned into polity contestation, that is, the 
public discourse transitioned from the politicization of substantive questions to the 
delegitimation of the political order. Dissatisfied voters developed both anti-EU sentiment and 
alienation from the domestic political mainstream that seemed complicit in the crisis politics – 
driving them into the arms of Eurosceptic challenger parties (Kreuder-Sonnen 2018a; Matthijs 
2017). Whether motivated by left-wing economic or right-wing cultural demands, and whether 
embedded in political discourses of Europe’s North-West, South, or East, these parties’ 
delegitimation attempts have at least one common denominator: the allegedly undemocratic 
nature of the EU that empowers an allegedly unaccountable, self-serving technocratic elite at 
the expense of the (national) people.  
In this vein, for example, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French Front National (now: 
Rassemblement National) in 2011 accused the “Brussels bureaucracy” of transforming Europe 
into “a technocratic, totalitarian project” arguing that the constraints on budget sovereignty 
introduced during the crisis represented a “crime against democracy and [a] crime against 
France” (Le Pen 2011, authors’ transl.). For her, the re-nationalization of decision-making has 
top priority, because “our most essential laws are decided in Brussels and imposed on the 
French people either without their knowledge or against their will” (Le Pen 2013, authors’ 
transl.). Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party and the most recent winner of the 
European elections in the UK (with his newly founded Brexit Party), condemned EU crisis 
measures aimed at fiscal consolidation as “dictatorial” (Farage 2011) and in 2013 concluded 
that “eurozone membership is completely incompatible with nation state democracy” (Farage 
2013). Similarly, the federal program commission of the German Alternative für Deutschland 
(AfD) in 2016 stated in retrospect that politics in Europe was marked by a “creeping de-
democratization” and that the euro rescue politics represented “illegitimate and illegal 
intrusions into the democratic decision-making structures of the participating nation-states.” 
(Federal Program Commission of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 2016, authors’ transl.). 
Even Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who is notorious for his xenophobic anti-
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immigration campaigns, after the height of the refugee crisis claimed that the “main threat to 
the future of Europe are not those who want to come here to live, but our own political, 
economic and intellectual elites bent on transforming Europe against the will of the European 
people” (Orbán 2017).  
The European far-left engaged in structurally similar de-legitimation attempts that also targeted 
the EU’s alleged lack of democracy. For instance, Pablo Iglesias, Secretary-General of the 
Portuguese party Podemos, declared in 2014: “Democracy in Europe has been the victim of an 
authoritarian derail. In the periphery of Europe, the situation is tragic, our countries have nearly 
become protectorates, new colonies, where powers that no one has elected are destroying social 
rights and threatening social and political cohesion in our societies.” (Iglesias 2014). In the 
same vein, Sahra Wagenknecht, then-minority whip for the German party DIE LINKE, has 
emphasized time and again that in her view, “the crisis management of the Euro group and the 
European institutions is less and less compatible with democratic values. The technocrats of the 
Troika fear democracy as much as a vampire fears the light.” (Wagenknecht 2015, authors’ 
transl.). Not least, the Greek protagonists during the crisis, Yanis Varoufakis and Alexis Tsipras 
of the Syriza party, strongly condemned what they perceived as deeply undemocratic methods 
of European crisis management. According to Varoufakis, the concept of democracy was “quite 
forgotten within the Eurogroup” and “some very powerful forces within the Eurogroup would 
want it to stay forgotten […].” (Channel 4 News 2015). In addition, Tsipras complained more 
than once that his democratically elected government was prevented from exercising its 
sovereign right to decide on how to achieve agreed upon objectives and how to distribute the 
burden. This was justifiable only if one adopted “a very extreme anti-democratic view […]. 
Elections shouldn’t take place; governments should be appointed then, technocrats. And they 
will be responsible for taking the decisions” (Tsipras 2015). 
This supply of political arguments and positions resonated increasingly well with voter 
demands across Europe. Popular opposition to the EU’s crisis governance was reflected in a 
decline in the legitimacy beliefs underpinning support for the EU. Armingeon et al. found, for 
instance, that in the Eurozone countries that were hit hardest by the crisis, levels of trust in 
political institutions and satisfaction with democracy (both at the domestic and EU level) have 
eroded dramatically: Between 2007 and 2013, the proportion of the population that has become 
detached from the political system (at the national and EU level) has increased from 27% to 
74% in Greece, 14% to 64% in Spain, and 39% to 58% in Italy (Armingeon, Guthmann, and 
Weisstanner 2016). These findings are echoed by Torreblanca and Leonard (2013), who find 
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that levels of trust in the EU among its citizenry have eroded markedly between 2007 and 2012. 
In sync with the decline in trust, voters increasingly put their hopes in populist fringe parties. 
As Hobolt and de Vries demonstrate empirically for both left and right, “citizens who were 
personally negatively affected by the crisis and who disapproved of EU actions during the crisis 
were more likely to cast a ballot for a Eurosceptic party” (Hobolt and de Vries 2016, 510). After 
a first surge in the 2014 EP elections, the numbers increased further especially for right-wing 
populist parties in the 2019 EP elections – consolidating and expanding a strong nationalistic 
faction in the EP. In core member states such as France, Italy, and the UK, they have become 
the strongest parties. Across Europe, they increased by about 5% and now occupy about one 
third of the seats in the EP.  
 
5. Reactive sequences beyond the EU: The international trade and human rights 
regimes 
So far, to account for the increasing de-legitimation of the LIO, we have laid out a theoretical 
argument about the self-undermining processes inhabiting the order’s institutional 
characteristics and illustrated its plausibility in a highly developed sub-order of the LIO, namely 
the EU. Of course, the EU is not representative of the wealth of IOs underpinning the LIO. 
Given its extraordinarily high degree of political authority and unprecedented amounts of 
transnational integration, we must assume that the EU is publicly much more salient than other 
IOs, and its democracy gap will thus entail societal mobilization that is unlikely to be matched 
in other IOs. However, our argument is about trends, not magnitudes. In general, our 
expectation is that the more international institutions exercise tangible political authority 
without providing for appropriate democratic input legitimation, the higher the probability that 
the legitimacy which affected people, parties, and governments ascribe to these institutions 
declines. If our argument holds, we should thus be able to find evidence for the mechanism in 
particular in cases of increasing political authority exercised by non-majoritarian institutions 
that are shielded – by deliberate design – from democratic politics. We submit that our argument 
is matched by developments in two most different issue areas covered by the LIO: international 
trade and human rights. In the following we provide two simple vignettes for these cases that 
should highlight that the mechanism is not an idiosyncrasy of the EU but applicable to different 
pillars of the LIO.  
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The international trade regime, centered on the WTO and its core free trade principles of 
national treatment and most favored nation, has seen a steep rise in authority with the passage 
from the GATT to the WTO in 1994. Most importantly, the political dispute settlement 
procedure under GATT has been replaced with the permanent Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) of the WTO where the quasi-judicial independent Appellate Body takes final decisions 
and makes conclusive determinations on the interpretation and application of WTO law (see 
Zangl 2008). This delegation of competences has firmly locked in the main tenets of the liberal 
trade regime. Moreover, the hardening of international trade rules has created growing 
distributional effects often leading to social stratification across industrialized and developing 
countries, but also – and importantly – across different groups of society within these groups of 
countries (Lakner and Milanovic 2016). Moreover, the expanding free trade agenda touches 
upon an increasing number of adjacent policy fields, such as environmental or consumer 
protection, which are seriously curtailed in their regulatory capacity due to the prospects of 
being challenged for the violation of WTO rules in front of the DSM – the so-called “regulatory 
chill effect.” (Eckersley 2004). This development is reinforced by the global spread of regional 
and bilateral free trade, preferential trade, or investment agreements that almost all delegated 
dispute resolution to standing or ad hoc arbitration panels. As is widely acknowledged, this 
international ‘constitutionalization’ of (neo-)liberal policy goals undercuts the possibility of 
democratically authorized deviation from this paradigm (Finbow 2016; Schneiderman 2008).  
Given their immunity to political contestation and inaccessibility for interest representation, the 
authority of DSMs in the free trade regime comes with a serious democracy gap. As a 
consequence, we see an increasing level of dissatisfaction with this sector of the LIO as well as 
growing traces of outright resistance. These come in diverse shapes and with different political 
motivations, but they are all designed to de-legitimize the institutions underpinning the 
international free trade regime. Two examples highlight the global spread of this phenomenon. 
First, civil society organizations in EU countries most directly targeted the democratic costs of 
free trade agreements and arbitration when vigorously opposing the adoption of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) in the years since opening negotiations on TTIP in 2013. Protest 
erupted less because of matters relating to the substance of free trade principles, but rather 
because of feared constraints on states’ democratic right to regulate domestically salient issues 
(see Scott Cato 2016). The strongest criticism was levelled at the plans for investor-state 
arbitration, which would have led to the establishment of further quasi-judicial bodies with the 
delegated competence to adjudicate on claims brought forward by corporate actors against 
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member state regulatory policies (de Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016). Second, large parts of the 
US-American electorate have come to embrace the notion that free trade represents a potential 
danger for domestic jobs and local industries. As evinced by the support for presidential 
candidate Donald Trump in the 2016 elections, who continuously promised – as one of the few 
consistent positions – to oppose multilateral free trade deals and renegotiate existing agreements 
in order to increase domestic employment, the distributional effects of the regime have given 
American voters a source of dissatisfaction with this part of the LIO (Manza and Crowley 
2017). Importantly, since the order is legally carved in stone and heavily institutionalized, 
Trump’s populist response is to attack the trade system as a whole, undermining both its 
constitutive principles (e.g., through punitive tariffs) and its authoritative institutions (e.g., by 
blocking the nomination of judges for the WTO DSM).  
In the international human rights regime, one type of institution has consistently gained 
authority in the post-Cold War era: international courts (ICs) (Alter 2014). In tune with a 
general increase of judicial authority across policy fields, it is particularly the ICs of regional 
human rights conventions such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that have become increasingly influential. While 
international judicial remedies for human rights violations had long been politically constrained 
through the principle of jurisdiction by consent of the defending state, these human rights courts 
are today equipped with compulsory jurisdiction and provide direct access for non-state actors 
including individual claimants (Alter 2014, 5). As a consequence, human rights ICs can, inter 
alia, nullify executive acts of domestic governments and even legislative acts of democratically 
elected parliaments if they are found to violate human rights obligations.  
The most common legitimation rationale of ICs consists in counter-majoritarian legalism (von 
Bogdandy and Venzke 2012, 14). In order to uphold the liberal tenets of constitutionalism, most 
importantly the protection of minority rights against a potential ‘tyranny of the majority’, ICs 
are conferred authority to override political measures that impinge on a previously agreed upon 
set of individual rights. ICs are thought to arrive at such conclusions in a putatively de-
politicized, technical process of law interpretation and application. Democratic input legitimacy 
is thus presumed irrelevant, if not counterproductive, to the legitimation of ICs (see also 
Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009). However, in at least two regards, IC authority has 
also become political by creating distributive consequences. First, the judicialization of the 
human rights regime may have led to its partial ‘overlegalization’ through which states are 
hampered in their ability to strike a balance between individual liberties and other important 
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societal objectives (Helfer 2002, 1853-1858). Arguably, active human rights ICs give 
expression to their liberal foundations in case law that creates obligations for states and rights 
for individuals extending into the future. This progressively narrows the political discretion – 
also of democratically elected parliaments – to decide on value allocations involving goal 
conflicts with individual liberties. This ties in with the second aspect, namely that regional 
“human rights courts have issued judgments about citizenship, religion, immigration, and other 
issues that directly concern the identity of polities” (Voeten 2019, 7). Here, ICs clearly interfere 
with conflicts over values and ideologies rendering them political actors irrespective of the 
legalistic procedure for arriving at their judgments. As Voeten argues, “in this sense the 
‘judicialization of politics’ almost inevitably spurs a politicization of the judiciary.”  (Voeten 
2019, 7).  
Hence, the empowerment of ICs in the human rights regime has led to a democracy gap created 
by the expansion of political authority while retaining a purely non-majoritarian legitimation 
rationale. Dissatisfaction with ICs and the political consequences of their rulings can of course 
be publicly voiced, but such criticism is bound to go unheard, precisely because of the ICs’ 
mandate to be aloof of politics. Consequently, dissatisfaction is likely to turn into polity-
contestation and even resistance. Indeed, over the past decade or so, observers have noted a 
veritable backlash against international human rights courts (Madsen, Cebulak, and Wiebusch 
2018; Voeten 2019). For example, after rendering judgments touching on the Tanzanian 
constitution and contentious issues such as Rwanda’s dealing with perpetrators and their 
accomplices of the 1994 genocide, the very young African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACtHPR) already faced serious and vocal resistance from both states, starting with Tanzania’s 
outright rejection of rulings against it and culminating in Rwanda’s withdrawal of its acceptance 
of direct individual applications to the Court. According to Daly and Wiebusch (2018, 294-
295), this could be the beginnings of particular patterns of resistance that might ‘escalate into a 
more systemic and even transnational critique of the court, resulting in either changes to the 
system, rendering it defunct by starving it of resources, or even shutting it down entirely’. 
Similarly, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago left the IACtHR after contentious rulings, and 
even several domestic courts in member states started resisting the Inter-American Court 
(Madsen, Cebulak, and Wiebusch 2018, 197). Not least, the ECtHR has been facing growing 
resistance since its vast expansion of authority after 1990. Not only did member states try to 
rebalance the system to the benefit of national politics with the 2012 Brighton Declaration, but 
both the government and the civil society in several member states such as the United Kingdom 
or Russia also more forcefully rejected the Court’s authority altogether. In the case of the United 
 23 
 
Kingdom, this is neatly traceable to ECtHR rulings that stopped the deportation of convicted 
Islamist terrorists due to their right to family life and gave prisoners the right to vote (Madsen 
2016, 169-170). Dissatisfaction and resistance thus stemmed from the Court’s involvement into 
highly polarized political matters, whose domestic democratic settlement was called into 
question by an international authority. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The LIO no longer enjoys the kind of ‘permissive consensus’ among political elites and broad 
sections of the publics in Western democracies it did in the past. Brexit, the decision by the 
United States to walk away from the Paris Climate Accord, the rising specter of protectionism 
and ‘trade wars’, and the electoral successes of populist, anti-internationalist political parties 
have put into question the taken-for-grantedness of liberal ideas and ideals, at the international 
as well as the domestic level. While the causes of dissatisfaction with the LIO are manifold, we 
argued in this paper that the fundamental delegitimation of the LIO has endogenous sources: It 
is, at least in parts, a homemade crisis. 
To shed light on the endogenous sources of the LIO’s legitimacy crisis, we focused on the 
mechanisms that help sustain the order, as well as those that threaten to undermine it. In a first 
step, we argued that the LIO is reinforced by institutional mechanisms that have helped to lock 
in liberal institutions, ideas, and policy choices. This liberal lock-in has been propelled by the 
delegation of governance tasks to allegedly technocratic international institutions, shielding 
them from political interference. Yet, these self-reinforcing institutional dynamics also trigger 
reactive sequences that threaten to undercut the LIO. The ‘success’ of the LIO puts a strain on 
democratic governance internationally and domestically. The more governance – with and 
through IOs – affects citizens’ value choices and carries redistributive implications, the more 
likely it is that opposition to the institutions representing the LIO is on the rise. Precisely 
because the LIO has been so successful in shielding its institutions from political interference 
by focusing almost entirely on their output legitimacy, policy contestation lacks avenues of 
democratic access and is thus likely to turn into polity contestation.  
Against this backdrop, future research should strive to address two lines of inquiry. First, 
resistance to the LIO may vary over time, across countries, and across different issue areas 
associated with the LIO. It is therefore important to analyze those conditions that moderate or 
amplify delegitimation in these different contexts. For instance, in times of crisis, when the 
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output legitimacy of international governance is in sharp decline, resistance to the LIO is more 
likely to be voiced and mobilized. Moreover, features of domestic politics are also likely to 
affect the mobilization of resistance to the LIO: the strength of populist parties that are 
particularly critical of international political authority, and domestic political opportunity 
structures – such as referendums – that raise the visibility and salience of international 
governance issues (see, for instance, Grande and Hutter 2016). Lastly, on the level of policies, 
certain policy issues subject to inter- or transnational governance conflicts, such as migration, 
resonate more strongly with the cultural-identitarian dimension of political conflict than others 
(e.g., agricultural subsidies). Populist parties, in particular, seek to mobilize resistance against 
inter- and transnational policies that can be construed as a cultural or identity threat to an ‘in-
group’, which is commonly defined along lines of national identity. Second, while this paper 
theorizes a mechanism that challenges the LIO in the long run, our analysis does not imply that 
the LIO is inevitably doomed. The order may indeed be temporarily destabilized, but it is well 
possible that it eventually outlives the challenge and emerges even stronger – depending on the 
way that liberal internationalists react to the backlash. Future research thus should explore the 
effects of polity-contestation on the LIO: Under what conditions does polity-contestation lead 
to a deterioration of the LIO, for example, through fragmentation, disintegration, and decline? 
Under what conditions does polity-contestation breed reforms or even counter-resistance, 
geared towards re-stabilizing the LIO? (Zürn 2018, 264) 
Finally, our analysis also carries normative implications. We contend that the de-politicization 
of socio-political value choices and the restricted access to contestation lies at the heart of the 
crisis of the LIO. We do not find that it is the normative elements of LI per se, which incite 
resistance. In effect, and as paradoxical as it may seem, if we want to protect the liberal 
substance of the order, it might be more advisable to open it to constant contestation than to 
shield it from political interference. On the one hand, the institutionalization of dissent would 
force the political representatives of the liberal majority to continuously justify the normative 
underpinnings of their decisions – increasing the likelihood of winning people’s minds (or at 
least not losing them). On the other hand, it would complicate things for the narrative of being 
left behind, not heard, and ruled by distant elites.  
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